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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Right of Privacy
In recent years the provisions of the first' and the fourteenth'
amendments relating to freedom of association and freedom of speech
have raised questions concerning the extent of the protection of indi-
vidual privacy.3 This article will examine these two provisions
in light of the decided cases to determine if constitutionally protected
rights of privacy4 exist for individuals in regard to their associational
relationships5 and their speech.
Associations
The idea that privacy of the individual underlies the limitations
upon governmental action contained in the first amendment was first
articulated by Justice Brandeis in a dissenting opinion to Gilbert v.
Minnesota.' Gilbert, a member of the Non-partisan League, was
convicted of violating a Minnesota statute7 which made the teaching
or advocation that men should not enlist in the armed forces of the
United States a crime. He had made such a speech at a public rally.
On appeal of this case to the United States Supreme Court it was
1 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,...
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
2 "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
'For other recent articles which have dealt with this same general area,
see Robinson, Protection of Associations From Compulsory Disclosure of
Membership, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 614 (1958); Comment, The Constitutional
Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J.
1084 (1961); Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 545 (1957). This article will not be
concerned with the tort action for the invasion of the right of privacy. See
generally for the elements of the tort action Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39
MicH. L. REv. 526 (1941); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALm. L. REv. 383 (1960);
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1891).
' The constitutionally protected right of privacy in regard to search and
seizure is beyond the scope of this article since the primary focus is on the
first amendment. For cases which illustrate how individual privacy is con-
sidered in relation to search and seizure cases see generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
'As used in this article, the term associational relationships means the
relations between the various members of associations, both as between them-
selves and as between outsiders.
'254 U.S. 352 (1920).
'Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 463 (now 40 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 612.08 (1947)).
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argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it was in con-
flict with the "inherent right of free speech respecting the concerns,
activities and interests of the United States . . . and its Govern-
ment."' The Court, for purposes of decision, assumed that such an
inherent right existed, but held that such a right was not absolute
and that a state, by virtue of its police power, could in time of war
constitutionally enact such a statute.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, first noted that the Minnesota statute
was not a war measure because it was not restricted in its application
to times when the nation was at war.9 Moreover, the statute, by its
broad sweep, prohibited teaching the doctrines of pacifism to any
one, at any time, and in any place. "Thus the statute invades the
privacy and freedom of the home. Father and mother may not
follow the promptings of religious belief, of conscience or of convic-
tion, and teach son or daughter the doctrine of pacifism."' 0 Finally,
Justice Brandeis argued that such rights as freedom of speech are
given to citizens of the states as a part of the liberty guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment." One of the underlying premises upon
which this dissent was based was that the individual citizen had a
right of privacy in regard to his beliefs"2 and in regard to his actions
in his home. Also, this right of privacy is a part of liberty given to
individuals by the first and fourteenth amendments.'
Privacy in regard to one form of associational relationship was
before the Court for the first time in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek.' 4
Prudential was held liable for damages in a civil suit for violation
8 254 U.S. at 328. 9Id. at 334.10 Id. at 335. 11 Id. at 336.
12 The idea that an individual's belief's are private and beyond the scope
of governmental action was alluded to in two early cases which involved
prosecution of members of the Mormon church for bigamy. Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
" The scope of the limitation upon state action which violates privacy was
not spelled out in the dissent. -However, in regard to speech, Justice Brandeis
followed the view that in times of emergency speech could be limited in order
to prevent a clear and present danger to the nation. It seems therefore that
in similar situations more intrusion into the privacy of the individual would
be tolerated. Perhaps Justice Brandeis believed that the right of privacy and
the right of freedom of speech should be identical in scope since the former
was derived from the latter. The clear and present danger test in regard to
speech was first announced by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919). For discussions of the clear and present danger test,
see generally Chafee, Freedom of Speech in Time of War, 32 HARV. L. REv.
932 (1919); Nathanson, The Communist Triat and the Clear and Present
Danger Test, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1167 (1950).1,259 U.S. 530 (1921).
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of the Service Letter Law of Missouri.'" This statute required
every corporation doing business in the state to furnish upon request
to any employee when the employee was discharged a letter.which
set forth the nature and duration of his service and which stated
truly the cause of the employee's departure. Prudential had refused
to give such a letter to Cheek, a former employee. One defense
which Prudential set up was that the statute in question violated the
fourteenth amendment because it deprived persons of their "liberty
of silence." The Supreme Court rejected this contention and held
that no provision of the Constitution conferred any liberty of silence
or any right of "privacy upon either persons or corporations.""
This holding, that corporations have no rights of privacy under the
Constitution, has been reaffirmed in a number of later cases.
The weight to be given to Prudential upon the question of an
individual's right to keep some of his associational relationships
private can best be determined by considering subsequent decisions.'
De Jonge v. Oregon9 is the leading case decided by the Court where
associational relationships in the area of political action were in-
volved. This case involved an Oregon statute" which provided that
any person who presided at, conducted, or assisted in conducting any
assembly which taught or advocated the doctrine of criminal syndi-
calism would be guilty of a felony. The Communist Party sponsored
a public rally in Portland to protest police violence in connection with
a longshoremen's strike then in progress. De Jonge, who was a
member of the Communist Party, was the second speaker at the
rally. In his speech he protested against conditions in the city jail,
the actions of the city police, and urged people at the rally to take
home Communist literature. While the rally was in progress police
arrived and arrested several of the participants, including De Jonge.
He was subsequently indicted, tried and convicted under the pro-
1 Mo. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §290.140 (1952).
259 U.S. at 542.
See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
8 It is interesting to note that the corporation was the only party in
Prudential asserting any claims to privacy; therefore, the reference to "per-
sons" could be considered as a dictum. Moreover, Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925), characterized the Court's reference to freedom of
speech and the fourteenth amendment as "incidental" and not determinative
of that question. Regardless, this broad language still stands because it has
never been expressly overruled.19299 U.S. 353 (1937). 20 Ore. Laws 1933, ch. 459, §§ 1-4.
[Vol. 40
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visions of this statute. As construed by the Oregon Supreme Court,21
this indictment charged that De Jonge participated in a meeting
called by the Communist Party and that the party advocated crimi-
nal syndicalism. The conviction was reversed on appeal by the
United States Supreme Court on the ground that it violated the
rights given to citizens of the states under the first amendment as
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
In support of its decision, the Court first noted that "freedom of
speech and of the press are fundamental rights .... The right of
peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free
press and is equally fundamental."2 2  Then it observed that these
rights are not absolute but that they may be subject to reasonable
regulation by a state where they are used "to incite violence and
crime."2 3  However, the rights themselves may not be curtailed; a
state may only prohibit the abuses which flow from their exercise.
Finally, the Court concluded that "peaceable assembly for lawful
discussion cannot be made a crime," that a state has no power to
inquire as to the relations of the speakers to the association, and that
mere participation in an otherwise lawful and peaceable assembly
cannot be made a crime.24
De Jonge established the concept that where individuals assemble
peaceably for a lawful purpose a state government has no power to
inquire into the relations between the participants. Clear recogni-
tion of the necessity for some privacy in regard to the relations be-
tween the members of associations was accorded by the Court; how-
ever, this right of privacy was limited to associations which had a
lawful purpose and which involved activities of a political nature.
Moreover, the sweeping language used in the Prudential decision
was limited.
The emphasis upon the lawfulness of the association and its effect
upon the degree of privacy afforded to its members is illustrated by
the earlier case of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zim-merman.25 A
New York statute26 required that every membership corporation and
unincorporated association which required an oath as a condition
of membership file with the secretary of state a sworn copy of a
roster of its members and a list of its officers. The statute further
21 State v. De Jonge, 152 Ore. 315, 51 P.2d 674 (1935).
22 299 U.S. at 364. 23Id. at 364.
2 1 Id. at 365. 25278 U.S. 63 (1928).
20 N.Y. Civm RIGHTs LAW §§ 53-56.
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provided that any person who remained a member with knowledge
that the organization had failed to comply with the registration pro-
visions would be guilty of a misdemeanor. Bryant was a member
of the Ku Klux Klan who knew that this association had failed to
register. He was prosecuted and convicted under the statute. Later,
he brought a habeas corpus action to obtain his release from jail,
contending, inter alia, that the statute was unconstitutional in that
it deprived him of the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. On appeal the United States Supreme Court rejected this
contention and held the statute to be a constitutional exercise of the
state's police power because this was a reasonable disclosure in view
of the nature and purpose of the organization involved. To support
this conclusion the Court cited hearings before the United States
Congress27 which tended to show that the Klan was conducting a
crusade against Catholics, Jews and Negroes, stimulating religious
and race prejudice and committing various acts of violence and
breaches of the peace. However, the Court recognized that such
disclosure of the membership to the public would be "an effective or
substantial deterrent" upon the association which would prevent it
from carrying out its purposes."'
Since the decision in Zimmerman, two federal registration and
disclosure statutes have been upheld against attacks on their consti-
tutionality in relation to the first amendment. The first was the
Foreign Agents Registration Act29 which requires that every person
acting as an agent of a foreign principal in certain listed capacities,
such as public relations counsel or publicity agent, file a registration
statement with the Attorney General. The statement must contain
such data as a copy of the agent's contract with his principal, the
compensation he received from his principal, and the names of all
persons who have contributed or promised to contribute to the
compensation received; further, willful failure to file the required
statement is made a crime. The Supreme Court, in a case which
raised no constitutional issue,80 construed the statute to mean that
no purely personal information was required of the registrant;
thus again the Court by implication recognized that disclosure of an
individual's private affairs must be strictly limited. Later, a lower
27 278 U.S. at 72.
28 Id. at 72.
29 52 Stat, 631 (1938), 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1958).
" Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
[Vol. 40
NOTES AND COMMENTS
federal court, in United States v. Peace Information Center,8 held
the statute to be constitutional as a regulation of the nation's foreign
affairs and as a national defense measure; further, the court observed
that the statute merely regulated a vocation and did not prohibit
speech or the expression of ideas.32
In Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Board8 the Supreme Court held that the registration pro-
visions of the Subversive Activities Control Act34 did not violate
the first amendment. This statute requires any organization which
has been found by the Subversive Activities Control Board to be
either a "Communist-action organization" or a "Communist-front
organization" to register with the Attorney General. The Com-
munist Party in the United States was found to be a Communist-
action organization and ordered to register. The Party, appealing
from this determination, contended that the registration provision
was unconstitutional because it deprived the members of the Party
of their freedom of association by forcing them to disclose their
membership. Rejecting this contention, the Court pointed out that
the Communist Party was directed by a foreign nation and that its
main purpose is to overthrow the government by force and violence.
Thus the purpose of the organization was illegal and the danger
which it presented was of such a magnitude that Congress had the
power to regulate it. Also, the statute under consideration did not
prohibit speech or association of the members; all that it did was to
require them to register. However, the Court recognized that in
many circumstances enforced disclosure could act as a deterrent to
the organization and an infringement upon the member's rights of
association. But in this case, the nature and purposes of the asso-
ciation over-rode any claims to privacy that its members may have
had.
Where neither the Communist Party nor acts of Congress have
been involved, three recent decisions3 5 have given clear recognition
to the idea that the Constitution imposes some limitation on the
power of state governments to expose the members of lawful asso-
ciations. These cases involved the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. In these cases, southern states
" 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951). (No appeal was taken.)
832Id. at 262. 88367 U.S. 1 (1961).' 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-797 (1958).
"Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357. U.S. 449 (1958).
1962]
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were attempting to force the NAACP to disclose the names of indi-
viduals who were members within the state. In the first and leading
case in this series, NAACP v. Alabama, Alabama brought suit to
enjoin the NAACP from doing business in the state because of
alleged violation of a statute86 which required all foreign corporations
doing business in the state to register with the secretary of state.
During the course of the trial, the trial judge, upon motion by the
state of Alabama, made an order which required the NAACP to
produce a large number of its records, including the Association's
membership lists. All of the required records where produced except
the membership lists which the Association refused to produce. For
this failure to comply with the court's order, the NAACP was found
to be in contempt and ordered to pay a heavy fine. 7 On appeal the
United States Supreme Court struck down this order of the trial
court and the contempt conviction based on it as being in violation
of the first and fourteenth amendments. Again, the Court recog-
nized that in some instances a state may have a legitimate reason to
expose the membership of associations; however, the Court clearly
stated that compelled disclosure may act as a restraint on freedom
of association. Thus "inviolability of privacy in group association
may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of free-
dom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs."3
In the latest case which has dealt specifically with freedom of
association, Shelton v. Tucker, 9 the Court held that an Arkansas
statute 0 which required all school teachers to disclose all organiza-
tions to which they had belonged for the past five years was an
unconstitutional interference with the teacher's freedom of associa-
tion. While recognizing the state's legitimate need to investigate
the teacher's qualifications, still "to compel a teacher to disclose his
every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free
association."'"
Speech and Individual Privacy
The cases discussed above give clear recognition to the fact that
in many lawful associations, the individual members have a right to
*' ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 192-198 (1959).
Ex parte NAACP, 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214 (1956).
38 357 U.S. at 463. ', 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
'o ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1229 (1960).
,1364 U.S. at 485.
[Vol. 40
NOTES AND COMMENTS
keep the fact of their membership private. A related area of an
individual's privacy is in regard to speech by other individuals.
Thus, in regard to free speech, which the first amendment protects,
the individual's privacy is a factor considered by the Court in deter-
mining the extent of this speech. The earlier cases that involved
constitutionally protected speech tended to put the right to speak
above all other considerations. Thus, in Martin v. City of Struthers4
it was held that a city ordinance which made criminal the act of
summoning people in private residences to their door to receive
circulars or other advertising matter was unconstitutional when
applied to members of Jehovah's Witnesses. While the Court rested
its decision primarily on the fact that the ordinance as applied pro-
hibited the free exercise of religion,4" it also relied on the fact that
the ordinance tended to curtail free speech because the distribution
of speech was restricted.44 However, the Court did note that this
ordinance was designed to protect a legitimate interest, that of pri-
vacy in the home, but in balancing the interests, the considerations
of free speech and the free exercise of religion out-weighed this
interest.
41
These ideas were carried over in the later case of Saia v. New
York.48 In this case the city of Lockport had an ordinance which
made it a crime to operate a loud-speaker which cast sound on a
public street except where matters of public concern were broadcast
and provided that advance permission must be obtained from the
chief of police. Saia obtained permission and proceeded to give
lectures on religious subjects in the town park by way of a loud-
speaker system on his car. Due to protests from some of the patrons
of the park, this permission was revoked. Saia continued to give
his lectures and to use his loud-speaker; as a result, he was con-
victed under the terms of this ordinance. On appeal the Court split,
the majority holding that this ordinance was unconstitutional on its
face because it was a prior restraint of speech.' Four Justices dis-
sented pointing out the difficulty of escaping from this type of noise s
and the obvious fact that the ordinance only prohibited one means
42319 U.S. 141 (1943). 3 Id. at 142.
"Id. at 147. "r Id. at 144.,8344 U.S. 558 (1948). 7 Id. at 559.
'8Id. at 563 (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Frankfurter jointed by Jus-
tices Reed and Burton).
1962]
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of distribution of speech.49 The dissent felt that the individual's
privacy out-weighed the right to speak in this manner.
The extreme position of the majority was repudiated by the Court
at its next term in Kovacs v. Cooper0 where it was held that a city
ordinance which prohibited the use of loudspeakers which emitted
"loud and raucous" noises on the public streets was constitutional.
The majority and concurring Justices all were of the opinion that
cities could impose some reasonable restraints on the means of
distribution of speech when these means tended to unduely disturb
the privacy of others. Saia was distinguished on the ground that it
involved licensing left to the uncontrolled discretion of the chief of
police without adequate standards.5" Where adequate standards are
written into the ordinance, it will be sustained. Thus the standard
of "loud and raucous" was held to be sufficiently definite and certain
to guide administrative action in regard to speech. Also, the Court
distinguished the loudspeaker situation from the hand-bill situation,
noting that the individual cannot be forced to take and read the
paper whereas, in the case of loud noise, he has no choice except to
listen; thus "he is practically helpless to escape this interference with
his privacy by loud-speakers" 2 Accordingly, privacy of the indi-
vidual was recognized by the Court as a legitimate interest which
deserves protection. Speech must be so limited that it does not
unduely disturb the privacy of others, and the first amendment
guarantees in regard to speech were not designed to give speakers
an unlimited license to disturb the privacy of others.
An individual's right to be free from loud speech is not absolute,
however, and other factors will be balanced in the resolution of the
particular controversy. This was illustrated in Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Polk.3 Here, a privately owned transit company in the
District of Columbia installed loud-speakers in its streetcars and
buses to provide "music as you ride" for its patrons. Out of every
half-hour of music provided, there was about a minute of commer-
cials extolling the virtues of the transit company. Acting in response
,9Id. at 568. (Dissenting Opinion of justice Jackson.)336 U.S. 77 (1949).
'Id. at 82. The Supreme Court of New Jersey had construed the stand-
ard in the ordinance to be strictly limited to sound trucks with "loud and
raucous" noises. Kovacs v. Cooper, 135 N.J.L. 64, 66, 50 A.2d 451, 452
(1946). This construction the United States Supreme Court followed. Id.
at 84.
I2 d. at 86.
'343 U.S. 451 (1952).
[Vol. 40
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to complaints from some of the patrons to this innovation, the Com-
mission found as facts (1) use of such devices was "consistent with
public comfort and safety"; (2) such devices presented no hazard
in regard to safety of the operation of vehicles; and (3) an over-
whelming majority of the patrons approved of the installation.54
Pollak appealed from this determination on the ground that the
Commission made errors of law in its determination. One error
assigned was that the decision was in violation of rights given to
citizens under the first amendment. The court of appeals reversed
the Commission "5 holding that the constitutional issue was properly
raised because the federal government was the agency which gave the
transit company an exclusive monopoly to operate in the District and,
as a result, there was governmental action involved. Also, this court
held that these devices violated the patron's liberty as secured by the
first and fifth amendments. 6
The Supreme Court sustained the Utilities Commission and
reversed the court of appeals. The majority rejected any claims
that the first amendment alone was violated by this practice. They
pointed out that no objectionable propaganda was put forth over
these speakers and the volume of the sound emitted by the speakers
was not loud enough to prevent conversation between passengers.57
To objections raised in connection with the commercials broadcast,
the Court said that these did not sustain a claim that passengers
were a captive audience forced to listen to commercial advertising
against their will." Finally, the Court rejected the contention that
the fifth amendment, when read with the first amendment, gave the
patrons a right of privacy in this situation. The Court pointed out
that in a public place, such as a streetcar or a bus, an individual's
rights of privacy are not as great as in his home; the interests of all
concerned must be taken into account in the drafting of regulations
for public vehicles, and the interests of the few cannot override the
interests of the many in this situation.5 9 In its decision, the Court
gave recognition to an individual's right to be free from loud and
annoying noises but, in balancing these against the interests of the
public in general, determined that on a public streetcar where the
"' Capital Transit Co., 81 P.U.R. (n.s.) 122, 126 (1949).
" Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
" Id. at 453. 17 343 U.S. at 463.
18 Ibid. 59 Id. at 464.
1962]
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majority of the patrons had no objection to the loudspeakers their
interests should prevail.
That privacy in the home will be protected by the Court in some
situations against certain types of speech was demonstrated in
Breard v. Alexandria.6" This case involved a "Green River ordi-
nance"'" which was enacted by the city of Alexandria to prohibit
any "solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient
vendors of merchandise" from going onto property used for private
residences without the owner's consent.62 Breard was in charge of
a group selling subscriptions to magazines; this group was con-
ducting a sales campaign in Alexandria. Members of the group
went to a number of private residences without invitation from the
owners in order to make sales; as a result, they were convicted under
the provisions of the ordinance. Breard contended that the ordi
nance was unconstitutional as applied to him because it acted as a
restrain on the distribution of speech. This was rejected by the
Supreme Court which said that the test was "a balancing of the
conveniences between some householders' desire for privacy and the
publisher's right to distribute publications" since the rights to free
speech given in the first amendment are not absolute. Here, since
the restriction was merely on one means of distribution it was rea-
sonable and the interest of the individual in his privacy prevailed.
In two areas where first amendment rights are involved, there
has been a recognition and protection of a right of privacy to the
individuals. Thus, where individuals associate themselves in lawful
groups which aim to achieve lawful ends, they have a right to keep
the fact of their membership private and governmental agencies can-
not force them to disclose this fact. And, where the right of free
speech is being exercised, it must be exercised in such a manner that
it will not disturb the privacy of individuals in their home or in
public. In both situations, the Court will balance the interests of
the individual to his privacy against the interest of the public in
having the membership of the association or the speech disseminated
00341 U.S. 622 (1951).
61 So named because the prototype was enacted by the town of Green
River, Wyoming, in 1931. For an earlier case involving the prototype see
Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933),
which held that the ordinance was not arbitrary or unreasonable and that it
did not constitute a burden on interstate commerce or deprive business of




to all. But, it seems clear that privacy of the individual is one factor
that the Court will take into consideration in the determination of
cases which arise in these areas.
CHARLES M. HENSEY
Contracts-Cost-Plus Building and Construction Contracts-
Interpretation of "Cost"
Perhaps the most frequently litigated issue arising from con-
struction contracts on a cost-plus basis' is the proper interpretation
of the word "cost." In Lytle, Campbell & Co. v. Somers, Fitler &
Todd Co.,' the leading case in this area, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court formulated the general rule3 that, unless a definition is ex-
pressly written into the contract, "cost" must be interpreted to mean
only those expenses which can be said to be "operative" or of a
productive nature in actually completing the construction, as dis-
tinguished from non-productive, indirect and general expenses or
"overhead." 4 The latter are presumed to have been provided for in
the agreed percentage of profit.5
'A "cost-plus contract" is one in which the contractor agrees to do cer-
tain work at cost plus a stated percentage of the cost as profit. It is different
from a "cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract" where the agreement is to do work
at cost plus a fixed amount of compensation, but for the purposes of this
note no distinction will be made between them since the problems attendant
to the interpretation of the word "cost" are the same in each. See, e.g.,
Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. Bloom, 139 Conn. 700, 96 A.2d 758
(1953). See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts §367(b) (1939); Annot. 27
A.L.R. 48 (1923).
2276 Pa. 409, 120 At. 409 (1923).
'Since the Lytle, Campbell case purported to lay down a general rule
for the interpretation of all cost-plus contracts no attempt has been made to
reconcile the cases on the basis of the precise wording of the contract before
the court. Those courts citing and relying on the Lytle, Campbell case have
tended to look to the class of contract involved, rather than the particular
words employed. See, e.g., Vinson & Pringle v. Lanteen Medical Lab., 63
Ariz. 115, 159 P.2d 612 (1945) ; Jensen v. Manthe, 168 Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d
699 (1959); Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 84 A.2d 617
(1951); Nolop v. Spettel, 267 Wis. 245, 64 N.W.2d 859 (1954). Cf. Dunn
v. Hammon Drug Co., 79 Ariz. 101, 284 P.2d 468 (1955).
'The rule of Lytle, Campbell has been cited with approval in many cases,
none of which have questioned its validity. See, e.g., Advance Auto Body
Works, Inc. v. Asbury Transp. Co., 10 Cal. App. 2d 619, 52 P.2d 958 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1935); Michelson v. House, 54 N.M. 197, 218 P.2d 861 (1950).
The normal definition of the word "profit," in the absence of circum-
stances tending to show otherwise, is "net profit," that is, the remainder
after all expenses of whatever nature have been paid. Buie v. Kennedy, 164
N.C. 290, 80 S.E. 445 (1913); Thomas v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 144
Wis. 470, 129 N.W. 522 (1911). Yet the word "profit" in a cost-plus agree-
ment is given a different meaning in that certain types of expenses, those
1962]
